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Introduction
Consolidation is a common response to financial and competitive pressures in many markets. The primary concern with consolidation is often financial: Will the merger increase prices? The healthcare sector involves additional complications. For example, both dimensions of demand for healthcare services are affected by third parties: treatments are prescribed by physicians while health insurance shields consumers from the full costs of care. Prices do not reflect their demand curve but are instead set by the insurer for public insurance plans or through negotiations between the insurer and providers in private insurance plans. Because of these factors, the implications of price changes in the healthcare sector on consumers may be more difficult to disentangle. Additionally, the quality of healthcare services is important for both survival and quality of life. Thus, the impact of consolidation in healthcare markets on non-price dimensions, such as quality, may be at least as important as its impact on price.
I define a hospital merger as the consolidation of two facilities into a single legal entity, wherein the license-relinquishing facility becomes a satellite campus of the license-retaining facility and hospital boards and physician and nursing staffs are unified. Despite the intensity of this transaction, the average rate of hospital mergers doubled from 12 per year in the mid-1980s to 24 per year in the early 1990s (Bazzoli et al. 2002) . Pressures along both price and quantity dimensions may have contributed to this wave of mergers. Average Medicare hospital prices fell initially with the institution of the Prospective Payment System in 1984 and again in 1988 with a strengthening in the requirements for elevated payments (Coulam and Gaumer 1991) . The advent of managed care in the 1990s reduced hospital prices within the private insurance market (Cutler, McClellan, and Newhouse. 2000; Dor, Grossman, and Koroukian 2004; Shen and Melnick 2006) . This fall in average prices coincided with a reduction in demand for hospital services.
2 Vogt and Town (2006) suggest that technological advances created an excess capacity by shifting many inpatient procedures to an outpatient setting and by reducing length of stay for other procedures. By creating a single legal entity, a merger enables capacity reduction through consolidating services between two facilities without being subject to state regulations (Dranove and Lindrooth 2003) .
Background
Hospital mergers have the potential to affect quality of care through several mechanisms.
If a merger creates financial benefits, the consolidated hospital may reinvest these gains into quality improvement. Likewise, service consolidation may increase procedure volume and consequently enhance provision of care. However, reducing competition may decrease the incentive to improve quality to attract patients. Finally, the disruption caused by unifying two independent facilities may negatively affect quality, particularly in the immediate aftermath of the merger.
Financial Impacts. Hospital mergers may create financial gains by achieving economies of scale and by resulting in higher negotiated prices. The literature suggests that hospital mergers, particularly facility-level mergers, are capable of attaining substantial cost savings (Conner et al. 1997; Dranove and Lindrooth 2003) . In addition, both anecdotal and empirical evidence suggests that a merged facility has additional leverage to negotiate larger reimbursements from private insurance companies (Devers et al. 2003; Capps, Dranove, and Satterthwaite 2003; Dafny 2009 ). Consequently, the combination of cost efficiencies and higher prices provides a merged facility with more resources. While these resources may not be 3 invested in quality improvements, they are unlikely to reduce quality. Thus, the financial impact of a merger on quality of service should be, at worst, neutral.
Volume-Outcome Relationship. Hospital mergers often involve service consolidation-at minimum, physician and nursing staffs are unified between the facilities. If the gained experience and shared expertise of the combined staffs improve outcomes, then mergers have the potential to improve outcomes and quality through this channel as well. Gaynor (2006) provides a review of the recent volume-outcome studies within the economics literature. Several studies find that outcomes improve when surgeons perform more of a particular procedure (Gaynor, Seider, and Vogt 2004; Gaynor, Seider, and Vogt 2005; Ho 2002; Gowrisankaran, Ho, and Town 2006) . Overall, this literature suggests that the service consolidation generated by many mergers and the resulting increase in volume at service-retaining facilities (including non-merging facilities) are likely to improve surgical outcomes.
Competition and Quality. Several theories suggest that hospital quality should increase with competition. In general, the mechanism behind this relationship is that consumers face little difference in out-of-pocket expenditures across hospitals, leading hospitals to compete for patients on a quality dimension rather than a financial one. Several of these theories are reviewed in Gaynor (2006) .
Most of the recent empirical research on hospital competition and quality is consistent with these theories. A seminal paper, Kessler and McClellan (2000) , uses Medicare heart attack data and a patient choice model, and finds that hospitals facing more competition have a lower incidence of adverse health events. Several researchers have built upon this foundation and have largely corroborated the linkage between competition and quality (Kessler and Geppert 2005; Sari 2002; Gowrisankaran and Town 2003) . To the extent that the competition-quality relationship is causal, these findings suggest that the effects of the reduction in competition associated with a merger would offset the effects of the financial and volume-outcome mechanisms.
Consolidation and Quality. To date, two papers investigate the direct impact of hospital mergers on measures of quality (Ho and Hamilton 2000; Capps 2005) . These studies use similar methodology: Both analyze the difference in quality measures before and after a merger as compared to those for non-merging hospitals. Both study 10 or 11 mergers across a five-year time period. Neither finds mergers to have a significant effect on quality, though the relatively small number of mergers and short time period studied may have reduced the power of their analyses. One concern with this hospital-based approach is that comparing merging hospitals to non-merging hospitals requires assuming that non-merging hospitals do not respond to the neighboring merger. The evidence that non-merging hospitals raise prices in response to nearby mergers (Dafny 2009 ) suggests that they may respond in the quality dimension as well. Another concern with this approach is the potential change in patient composition. If perceived changes in quality affect post-merger patient choices, then this approach may yield biased estimates.
Analytical Approach
This paper builds upon the previous literature in a number of ways. I address many of the concerns detailed above with a geographic approach: I measure health outcomes by zip code. By exploiting the variation in exposure to a merger across zip codes, I analyze the average impact of a merger on all patients in the study population. Exposure is measured as the share of patients in the zip code who are discharged by the merged facility. While this method cannot disentangle the 5 effects of changes in the merged facility from changes in non-merging facilities or patient sorting, it will capture the full market-level impact.
Forty mergers transpired throughout California from 1990 to 2005. This analysis utilizes inpatient discharge data through 2006 to study the impact of these mergers on inpatient mortality and treatment intensity among heart disease patients. I extend this analysis by isolating the competition mechanism from overall exposure to a merger. Finally, I replicate the hospital-based analysis with this larger panel of mergers to compare its results with those from the geographic approach.
Data and Methods

Data
California's Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development (OSHPD) provided the annual inpatient discharge data set for this project. The data includes patient-level data on demographic characteristics, payment, diagnoses, and procedures performed for every inpatient discharge. I limit my sample to discharges from general acute facilities because treatment at long-term care facilities likely consists of rehabilitative care after the patient has been discharged from a general acute facility. I restrict my analysis to patients with heart disease, allowing me to construct relevant outcome variables and co-morbidity factors to use as control variables. Limiting my analysis to patients with a heart attack (acute myocardial infarction, AMI) might seem to be ideal because AMI requires immediate hospitalization, minimizing potential selection bias in admission decisions. However, there are too few zip codes with enough AMI discharges in all quarters.
Instead, I include all individuals with a chronic or acute diagnosis of ischemic heart disease 6 (IHD) 1 and create a balanced panel of 697 zip codes with at least 15 IHD discharges in all 68
quarters. Ninety percent of these zip codes are exposed to a merger, containing residents who were discharged from a merged facility during the study period. Because IHD varies in severity, hospitals may have different decision rules for admitting a heart disease patient. This issue
should not be problematic unless a merger induces a change in admission criteria. I demonstrate below that mergers do not appear to have an impact on the admission criteria for IHD patients. 
Empirical Framework
Outcomes Analyzed. My analysis examines the impact of hospital mergers on treatment intensity, the likelihood of receiving treatment within one day, and inpatient mortality. The primary intensity measure is the percentage of patients receiving bypass surgery or angioplasty.
Hospital mergers may increase use of these intensive heart surgeries if they become more accessible after the merger. Eighteen merging pairs offered cardiac surgery services, 2 with overlapping cardiac surgery capabilities and 16 without. Consolidation of all cardiology services for these 16 facilities would make these procedures more accessible to those who would have otherwise chosen the non-offering facility. But while a patient may be more likely to choose a hospital with these capabilities when she expects to need them, such as when she may be experiencing a heart attack, distance to the hospital may sometimes be a greater priority.
The number of procedures a patient experiences during a hospital stay is another measure of treatment intensity, and the likelihood of receiving treatment within one day could reflect quality in that delays may be associated with treatment by less-qualified physicians (Doyle et al. 2006) , overcrowding, or understaffing. Inpatient mortality is the final outcome measure. While it is a low probability and an extreme adverse event, it is also the clearest measure of poor outcomes. Because discharge practices may affect inpatient mortality, I include average length of stay as a companion outcome.
Identification Issues. Identifying the causal impact of a merger within a hospital is difficult because a merger may cause patient reallocation, confounding the identification of outcome or treatment changes. I use the term "merged share" of the market to refer to the market share of the merged facility in a zip code exposed to a merger. Hospital/Valley Medical Center merger. This heterogeneity is unlikely to be entirely random, suggesting that patient composition changes could bias a hospital-based analysis.
Reallocation could stem from two sources. The closest facility offering a needed service might no longer be one of the merged facilities, or the public's perception of a merged facility's quality relative to other local hospitals could change. Sicker patients might be willing to travel farther for quality care, causing a negative correlation between perceived quality change and average patient health at a merged facility. While the first scenario is unlikely to bias hospitalbased analyses, the latter could bias quality change estimates.
I analyze outcomes within geographic areas because the population within a defined geographic area is unlikely to change in average health status in response to a merger. Previous hospital merger research has used geographic areas such as counties or has incorporated overlapping fixed radius market definitions. Both of these methods have drawbacks. Counties are large enough that individuals on opposite ends of the market face a different set of nearby hospital choices, and individuals near a market border may also be closer to a hospital in another market. Fixed radius definitions are difficult to establish because hospitals of different sizes and service offerings have different geographic reaches.
Unlike counties or fixed radius definitions, zip codes are generally small enough that all individuals face a similar set of relevant hospital choices, and patient choices determine the relevant hospitals. Exposure to a merger is measured as the share of patients within a zip code discharged from a merged facility. This zip code-level analysis exploits the heterogeneity of exposure to a merger to measure its effect. Merger effects on quality or treatment practices should be more visible in zip codes with higher merged shares. And because mergers are unlikely to induce changes in residence, I can compare pre-and post-merger outcomes for plausibly similar populations.
The extent to which outside factors may affect both hospital mergers and outcomes represents a limitation to this approach. For example, local changes in the insurance market or physician/nurse labor markets could affect care outcomes and induce hospitals to merge.
Because these types of factors are unobserved, I cannot include them in my analysis. A zip codelevel analysis also encompasses not only the direct effect on patients using the merged facility but also the merger's ripple effects. These ripple effects include hospital responses to changes in the competitive landscape and patient responses to relative changes in quality. While I cannot disentangle the direct effect of a merger on the merged facility's quality from the indirect effects of patient reallocation and non-merging hospital changes, I can assess the merger's market-level impact.
Instrumental Variables Strategy. Relying on merged market shares is also subject to selection bias because shares respond to hospital choice. I use a solution similar to the approach used by Town et al. (2006) and predict post-merger shares with the sum of merging facility 11 shares from one year before the merger. 3 Even if merger discussions had begun one year before, it is unlikely that this information would be publicized, rendering patient choices unaffected by the impending merger. As described above, the baseline ordinary least squares (OLS) model is:
( This model is identified on four main assumptions. First, while the specific hospitals that merge are endogenous, merger timing is not. As described above, completing a merger involves a complex negotiation process; thus, it is difficult to predict when a merger will be finalized, regardless of when negotiations begin. Second, the merger does not affect the composition of patients residing within a zip code. While available hospitals and their quality may affect housing choices, a merger is unlikely to induce a widespread decision to relocate. The third assumption is that pre-merge shares of discharges are not affected by the impending merger. As a robustness check, I performed the same analysis using shares from two years before the merger.
The results from this analysis are very similar in magnitude and significance to those detailed later in this paper.
The fourth assumption is that merging hospitals do not change their admission criteria for suggest that admission practices at merged facilities changed little, if at all, after a merger. (1)- (2) and (5)- (6) demonstrate that the coefficient on pre-merge share is a precisely estimated 0.84 with or without trends. The large F-statistics suggest a strong first-stage relationship. Columns (3)- (4) and (7)- (8) was selected for a reference point because it is near the middle of the study period and threequarters of mergers were completed by the end of this year. Zip codes with larger exposure to a merger were affected proportionally to their share.
Results and Discussion
The next four columns in Table 3 list the coefficients for receiving primary treatment within one day and the average number of procedures. Both coefficients are statistically 14 significant in the specifications without trends, yet their magnitudes fall substantially and the coefficients for treatment within one day are no longer statistically significant once trends are included. For the average zip code, the specifications with trends suggest that individuals are not more likely to receive treatment within one day and that they receive 2.0 percent more procedures.
The final two outcomes-inpatient mortality and average length of stay-are listed in the remaining columns. These outcomes are discussed together because hospital discharge practices could affect inpatient mortality rates. A decrease in inpatient mortality might be questionable coupled with a decrease in average length of stay if a hospital changed its discharge practices such that dying patients were more likely to be discharged to die at home. Indeed, the OLS results suggest a minimal and marginally statistically significant effect on inpatient mortality and average length of stay. The point estimates suggest a 1.1 percent increase in inpatient mortality and less than a 1 percent increase in average length of stay for the average zip code, though
neither estimate is precise.
OLS results may be biased if individuals respond to a perceived quality change. The last two panels of Table 3 report the IV specification results. The IV specifications suggest a similar or slightly larger impact on treatment intensity. The coefficients for surgical utilization remain the same, though the coefficients for receiving treatment within one day and number of procedures are larger. For example, the coefficient of 0.392 in column (6) of panel 4 suggests that the average number of procedures rises by 2.9 percent for the mean zip code. Since surgery utilization increases 28 percent more than the number of procedures, the increase in surgeries is probably replacing less intensive procedures in some cases and adding to them in others.
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The difference between OLS-and IV-estimated impacts on inpatient mortality is more striking. The coefficient on merged share increases by 50 percent to 0.003 without and with trends, though it is not quite significant at the 5 percent level in the latter. For the average zip code, this point estimate suggests an increase in inpatient mortality of 0.0006 percentage points, or a 1.7 percent increase above the 2000 average of 3.7 percent. The coefficients for average length of stay increase as well, and the specification with trends suggests that length of stay increases by 1.3 percent and may contribute to some of the increase in inpatient mortality if dying patients are less likely to be discharged to die at home.
As a specification check, I estimated a reduced form model in which the instrument, premerge share, was interacted with timing dummy variables for pre-and post-merger time periods.
Appendix Table 2 suggests that the effect of a merger is not transitory, nor is there a change in the outcomes before the merger transpires. The one exception is for the likelihood of receiving treatment within one day. In these specifications, as in the OLS and IV specifications, the coefficients for the timing interacted share variables fall by half or more and lose statistical significance when trends are included.
Isolating the Competitive Effect
The main specification does not allow for attributing outcomes to any particular causal mechanism. To explore the effects of changes in the competitive environment on hospital outcomes, I add HHI as an explanatory variable, instrumented with predicted change in HHI.
Predicted change in HHI is constructed by calculating the change in HHI from treating merging facilities as a single entity. Like the instrument for post-merger shares described above, predicted change in HHI is calculated using shares from one year before the merger. The strength of the 16 instruments remains strong with this addition; the F-statistics are well above 10 for each of the relevant first-stage regressions, and their predictive power continues in the years following the merger (see Appendix Table 3 ).
The first two panels of Table 4 report the results from these IV specifications without and with trends. These results suggest that overall exposure drives the intensive surgery result, while increased concentration drives the increase in procedures. These specifications also suggest a much larger impact on number of procedures. The mean HHI in a zip code affected by a merger is 0.285, so the coefficient of 3.298 implies an increase of 0.9 procedures-a 34 percent increase.
The mortality results in these specifications are especially striking. The coefficient on merged share is a solidly statistically significant 0.007, while the coefficient on HHI is a statistically insignificant -0.02. Non-competitive mechanisms appear to drive mortality increases, while consolidation may reduce mortality. The merged share coefficient suggests a 3.9 percent increase in mortality. These specifications suggest that average length of stay is unaffected.
Hospital-Based Analysis
Thus far, the source of the differences between the inpatient mortality results reported above and those reported in the previous literature is unclear. I have asserted that the geographical approach enables me to avoid bias from patient composition changes and to capture the effect of a merger on non-merging hospitals. However, the larger data set in this study could allow for more precision outside of any methodological differences. To explore this issue, I
follow the approach used by Ho and Hamilton (2000) . The outcome variables are regressed on the same set of control variables, and a binary variable identifies discharges from a merged facility. Hospital fixed effects and trends replace zip code fixed effects and HRR trends. 6 While these are individual-level specifications, I label this approach "hospital-based" because results are driven by differences between merging and non-merging hospitals.
In this analysis, continuous variables such as length of stay are discharge-specific, and binary variables such as inpatient mortality are indicator variables. Following the Ho and
Hamilton analysis, I also control for hospital volume. Computing limitations restrict me to a 5 percent sample of IHD discharges.
The last two panels of Table 4 report these results. Without hospital trends, merged facilities appear to increase treatment intensity and promptness relative to non-merging hospitals.
However, the inclusion of trends substantially reduces the magnitude and statistical significance of these effects. In both cases, the mortality coefficients are small and statistically insignificant; thus, the longer time span and additional mergers do not yield similar results between the hospital-based and geographic approaches, particularly for the mortality results.
Discussion
The results detailed above suggest that hospital mergers are associated with greater treatment intensity, both in the type of treatment performed and in the number of procedures patients received during a hospital stay. The competition mechanism appears to drive the increase in procedures, while general merger exposure appears to drive the increased utilization of intensive surgeries. Mergers are also associated with increased inpatient mortality, particularly when the competition channel is isolated. Because the empirical methodology does not isolate other channels through which mergers might affect outcomes, I can only speculate on the mechanisms in play. Merger-induced price increases may lead to infrastructure expansion and, consequently, increased treatment intensity. However, mergers also allow for cost cutting in the form of infrastructure consolidation, requiring some patients to travel farther for care. Additional travel time, even in urban and hospital-dense areas, has been found to increase mortality from heart attacks (Buchmueller et al. 2006 ). These results differ from those found in the previous literature in that I find statistically significant increases in inpatient mortality. The results in the last section of this paper suggest that the larger data set is not driving the difference in results. I believe the difference is, instead, driven by some combination of not comparing merging facilities to affected non-merging facilities and estimating models that are less susceptible to bias from changes in patient composition.
It is difficult to discern from the results listed above whether the increases in treatment intensity enhance or reduce welfare. Increased provision of heart surgeries may improve the length or quality of life for some individuals, and the volume-outcome literature suggests that outcomes may improve with the additional surgical volume. However, any improvements must be weighed against the additional cost of providing the surgeries. Additionally, previous research has found a negative relationship between more intensive treatment and quality of care for heart attack patients (Fisher et al. 2003 ). Furthermore, it is possible that increases in treatment intensity are related to increases in mortality. Access to readmission rates and 30-day mortality rates may shed further light on this question, though it would remain difficult to weigh improvements in quality against the costs of more intensive treatments. This question requires further investigation. All averages are weighted by number of discharges unless otherwise specified. The data sample includes all discharges with a major diagnostic category of "circulatory system, diseases & disorders" (5) and any diagnostic code of "Ischemic Heart Disease" (ICD-9 codes 410-414) in relevant hospitals. Numbers of hospitals and mergers are as of the end of the calendar year.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Robust standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Robust standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Appendix Zip codes are only included if they have 15 or more discharges in every quarter. All regressions include quarter and zip code fixed effects and are weighted by the number of heart disease discharges. Standard errors are clustered by zip code. Control variables include the percentage of discharges with demographic characteristics such as race, gender, and age categories; with expected payer such as Medicare and private insurance; with co-morbidities such as hypertension, diabetes, and heart failure; admission through the ER, and a constant. 
